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THE DYNAMICS OF A HOMEOSTATIC PUNISHMENT PROCESS*
ALFRED BLUMSTEIN,** JACQUELINE COHEN,J AND DANIEL NAGINt
and non-criminal behavior would be adjusted to
I. INTRODUCTION
In his now classic analysis of crime, Durkheim re-designate at least part of the previously criminal
behavior as non-criminal, or the intensity or duraargues that some level of crime is "an integral part
of all healthy societies... provided that it attains tion of punishment for those convicted would be
and does not exceed a certain level for each social reduced. A similar but opposite reassessment
type."' He contends that crime is an unavoidable would occur when fewer people commit currently
consequence of the very processes which contribute punishable acts. Their principal evidence in
to the maintenance of social cohesion. As the set support of this hypothesis is the stability of imof standards and beliefs which define and bound prisonment rates in the United States over the
a society are specified, some types of behavior will period 1930-1970 and in Norway over the period
be prohibited and those engaging in these be- 1880-1964 (Figures la and lb). Canadian imprisonment rates over the period 1880-1959 have
haviors will be considered criminals. Furthermore,
the public condemnation and punishment that been obtained subsequently, and these (Figure 1c)
follows a criminal act serves to articulate and show the same stability behavior.
In this paper, the theoretical structure and the
reinforce the common set of norms and sentiments
empirical
basis of this earlier work is extended,
which ultimately guides the actions of the members
and
some
processes
that might generate the stable
of the society, thereby further enhancing social
cohesion. Thus, while crime is a natural outgrowth level of punishment are hypothesized. First, the
of the processes generating social solidarity, it is time series of the imprisonment data for the
the social response to crime that particularly United States, Norway and Canada are analyzed
to provide an empirical description of the strucserves to consolidate and reinforce that solidarity.
2
Blumstein and Cohen have re-examined Durk- ture of the data. These results indicate a striking
heim's theory of a stable level of crime and pose similarity in the data structures in the three counan alternative position emphasizing the stability tries studied. Different models of the crime and
of punishment. Their argument is that the stand- imprisonment process are then explored in an
ards or thresholds that define punishable behavior effort to characterize an underlying process that
are adjusted in response to overall shifts in the would generate the kinds of time series observed.
behavior of the members of a society so that a A sensitivity analysis is then performed to identify
roughly constant proportion of the population is how the different parameters of one such model
always undergoing punishment. Thus, if many contribute to national differences in observed
more individuals engage in behavior defined as levels of punishment.
punishable, the demarcation between criminal
II. THE BASIC HOMEOSTATIC HYPOTHESIS
* Research for this paper was conducted under
Ford Foundation Grant #730-0097, "Cross-National
First it is necessary to review the stability of
Comparative Study of Criminal Justice Systems"
punishment theory. Blumstein and Cohen' posit a
and LEAA Grant #75NI-99-0005, "Analysis of statistical density function
fB(x), representing the
Deterrence for Criminal Justice Planning."
**Director, Urban Systems Institute, Carnegie- distribution of behavior in a society. The basic
concept of such a distribution is that there exists
Mellon University.
t Research Associate, Urban Systems Institute, a range of behavior which may be viewed at one
Carnegie-Mellon University.
extreme as being compulsively moralistic and at
t Assistant Professor, Institute of Policy Science
the other as being severely criminally deviant
Public Affairs, Duke University.
with all shades in between (see Figure 2). It is
IE. DURKHEIM, TnE RULES OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL
METHOD 66-67 (S.Solovay & J. Mueller trans.
then hypothesized that society establishes a
1964).
boundary, B 0 , defining the limits, of legitimate
2Blumstein & Cohen, A Theory of the Stability
of
3
Punishment, 64J. CRim.L. & C. 198 (1973).
Blumstein & Cohen, supra note 2.
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FIGURE la
Annual imprisonment rate in the United States: 1930-704
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FIGURE Ib
Annual imprisonment rate in Norway: 1880-1964-

behavior. Individuals who engage in behavior
B > B0 are deemed punishable.
4 U.
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A punishment probability function, g(B), is
introduced which reflects the probability that a
person engaging in behavior beyond Bo will be
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1970, at 138-61
(91st ed. 1970).
Letter from Nils Christie, Institute of Criminology
and Criminal Law, University of Oslo, to A. Blumstein, 1970.
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Annual imprisonmnent rate in Canada: 1880-19596
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FIGURE 2
The behavior distribution
punished, and a punishment intensity function,
I(B), reflects the intensity of punishment applied
to a punished individual at B. Thus, a, the aggregate amount of punishment delivered by society,
is a function of the frequency of deviant behavior
in that society and the expected punishment
7
associated with deviant behavior.
It is then hypothesized that a will be relatively
stable over time in a given society, even though it
may deviate somewhat for severely disruptive
periods like wars or depressions. One means of
maintaining the stable value of a in the face of
changing behavior in the society is through redefi6HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF CANADA

& K. BuCxLY ed. 1965).
More precisely

URQUHART

ff(x)g(x)I(

nition of the boundary, B0 , between the criminal
and the non-criminal. Under this homeostatic
hypothesis, if behavior were to become less criminaly deviant, that is, if fB(x) were to shift to the
left, B0 would be adjusted to B0 ' < B 0 , so that
a(Bo) = a'(Bo') = a.8
It is argued that the social forces accounting for
stability include more than simple prison-cell
capacity, or even the limited willingness of society
to accept the economic burden of processing individuals through the criminal justice system, con8 In terms of the integral formulation, the hypothesis can be represented by:

634-59 (M.

f(x)g'(x)I'(x) dx

z'(Bo) =

d

=

fB

fa(x)g(x)I(x) dx

=
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fining them and foregoing their productivity. Such
an explanation does not account for the tendency
of downward movements in imprisonment rates to
reverse themselves and return to the mean. More
fundamental considerations of social structure are
probably at work. If too large a portion of the
society is declared deviant, then the fundamental
stability of the society may well be disrupted.
Likewise, if too few are punished, the basic identifying values of the society will not be adequately
articulated and reinforced, again leading to social
instability. In the former case there will be pressures toward decriminalizing some behavior, while
in the latter, there will be pressures for stricter law
enforcement and perhaps more severe punishments.
III.

TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS

Time-series analysis is often directed at a sequence of observations, such as those of Figure 1,
in order to discover structures in the data, particularly relationships between an observation in
period t and those in prior periods. In time-series
analyses, two basic types of structures typically are
explored: autoregression and moving averages.
These can be studied either separately or in combination and, in many instances, can explain the
systematic behavior of the time series.
In the autoregressive structure an observation
at t is a weighted linear function of the observations from the preceding T periods, and the autoregression is said to be of order T. In the moving
average process an observation at t is the result of
stochastic variations about the mean.9 The stochastic variations in observations in successive
time periods are related by an autoregressive type
structure. Thus, the relationship between an
observation at time t and prior observations occurs
either through the serial correlation of stochastic
deviations from the mean (moving average), or
through serial correlation of the observations
themselves (autoregression). While the difference
between these two processes in terms of the behavior of the induced time series may not be
obvious, their properties are very different. These
differences permit the wide variety of time series
which are encountered in practice to be estimated
by making judicious use of autoregressive, moving
average or mixed (autoregressive and moving
average) processes.
' See Appendix I for a more detailed description
of autoregressive and moving average structures.
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In order to gain further insight into the dynamics of the imprisonment process, time-series analysis was performed on the annual imprisonment
rate data for the United States, Norway and
Canada. Briefly, the analysis involves the following steps:
1) Using ordinary least squares, an autoregressive furction of arbitrarily high order,
say T, is estimated. If the autoregressive coefficient of the Tth subscript is statistically
insignificant, an autoregressive relationship
of order T-1 is estimated. This process is
continued until a statistically significant
autoregressive coefficient is found.
2) To determine if there is serial correlation of
the stochastic component, et (that is, a
moving-average process), autoregressions
again of arbitrarily high order t are run on
the deviations of the actual data from those
predicted by the estimated autoregression.
If no significant autoregression coefficients
are then found, there is strong evidence of
no serial correlation in the stochastic component.
In the time-series analysis for each country,
autoregression functions of order 4 (T = 4) were
estimated and no significant coefficient 4 .r was
found until the second-order autoregression was
estimated. When the stochastic components were
checked for serial correlations, no significant
autoregression relationships were found among
the deviations. Figure 3 is a plot of the actual
Canadian data against the values predicted by the
estimated second-order autoregression for Canada.
A visual inspection reveals both the high explanatory power of the regression and the seemingly
random nature of the deviations.
Thus, one can reasonably conclude that the
time series of the imprisonment rates for the
United States, Norway and Canada each followed
a second-order autoregressive process with no
moving average component. If rt is the imprisonment rate (prisoners/100,000 general population)
in year t, we can adequately express rt as a simple
linear function of the imprisonment rates in the
two immediately previous periods:
rt

=

6 + 4irt-i + 0 2rt-2 + Et

where:
rt = the daily average imprisonment rate in
year t,
c,4i = fixed parameters of the process, and
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FIGURE 3
Actual vs. predicted imprisonment rate in Canada: 1885-1959
TABLE 1
ESTIMATED AUTOREGRESSION PARAMETERS FOR THE
ANNUAL

10

IMPRISONMENT RATE

(rt) IN THE

UNITED STATES, NORWAY AND CANADA

rt=

+

Oirt-I +

02rt-2 +

Et

Parameter

USA

Norway

Canada

01

1.42
(10.35)
-. 63
(-4.41)
22.74
(2.76)
.84

1.17
(10.47)
-. 35
(-3.13)
9.34
(3.15)
.78

1.25
(11.58)
-. 42
(-3.83)
7.42
(3.04)
.79

02

2

r

-

Et = independent and identically distributed
random variables with mean zero and
variance a2.
Table I presents the estimated autoregression
parameters for each country. Given the wide
range of possible structures for these data, the
finding that the imprisonment rates in the three
different countries follows a second-order autoregression strongly suggests that a similar mechan10The imprisonment rate is the average daily
prison population per 100,000 general population.
In the United States and Norway the rate base is
100,000 total population, while in Canada it is
100,000 population 16 years of age or older.

ism may be generating each, albeit with different
driving parameters. It would be desirable to be
able to identify a mechanism consistent with these
empirical findings.
Processes following a second-order linear differential equation, not necessarily with constant
coefficients," generate second-order autoregressive
functions. This connection is shown in Appendix
II. Table 2 presents the parameters of the associated differential equation for each country as
well as the characteristic time period ("I) of the
12
cycles for each equation.
Thus, a second-order differential equation is
the mathematical characterization of a dynamic
process that would generate the time series that
were observed. Such an equation, however, is only
an abstract representation that could describe any
number of physical or social processes. One can
posit a flow process in and out of prison that would
" The general second-order differential equation
with constant coefficients is: rt + crt + drt = F,
where rt is the average daily imprisonment rate at
t, and it and Ft are respectively the first and second
derivatives of rt.
12A

differential equation of the specified form

results in cyclical behavior when c' the period IIis obtained from:
IId-

47r

4d < 0, and
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TABLE 2
PARAMETERS FOR THE SECOND-ORDER DIFFERENTIAL

MATED

EQUATION

WHICH

AUTOREGRESSIVE

GENERATES

THE

ESTI-

PROCESS FOR THE

IM-

PRISONMENT RATE TIME-SERIES

comparing the parameters of the differential
equation for the imprisonment rate generated by
the model with the same parameters derived from
the autoregressive parameters estimated from the
observed time series.

C -42
01 +

F=

42
42

-

1

-

02

A. Prisoner, Ex-Convict, and Virgin Model

II = periodicity =

47r

c

2

Parameter

USA

Norway

Canada

C

.25
.33
36.10
11.2 yrs.

1.34
.51
26.69
25.4 yrs.

.98
.40
17.62
15.7 yrs.

d
F
I

so that each population is defined solely as a
function of its own derivatives (see Appendix IV).
The result for any population group is in general
a second-order differential equation, although in
some systems, the second-order term vanishes,
leaving only a first-order equation. We can judge
the adequacy of each hypothesized structure by

rt + cit + drt = F

d

[Vol. 67

generate the differential equation consistent with
the observed behavior of the time-series. With
such a model the stability of imprisonment rates
can be interpreted in terms of conceptually meaningful characteristics of a society; for example,
the degree of punitiveness and the level of conformity. The first formulation is quite simple and
requires only that the prison population remain
stable through a simple balancing of receptions
and releases. This formulation will be shown to be
inconsistent with the observed behavior of the
Canadian data. A second, more elaborate model
which incorporates the homeostatic principles will
be shown to be much more satisfactory and consistent with the Canadian data.
IV. EXPLORATION OF POSSIBLE
EXPLANATORY MODELS

In this section, models of the social mechanism
generating imprisonment rates are developed and
their consistency with the observed stability and
second-order autoregressive movement of the time
series are explored. The models are developed by
partitioning the total population of a society into
three groups, one of which is the prison population. The flow rates of individuals among these
groups is then examined. These simultaneous
flows generate a system of simultaneous first-order
differential equations. Such systems can be solved

The first model to be examined partitions the
total population T(t), into a prison population
P(t), an ex-convict population M(t), and a population of individuals who have never been to
prison (virgins) V(t). The possible flows in this
structure are shown in Figure 4. Within this
structure, the only mechanism for maintaining a
stable imprisonment rate would be the balancing
of releases from P(t) with receptions from V(t)
and M(t).
When formalized, the relationship among the
model flows can be used to derive a second-order
differential equation for the imprisonment rate.
The parameters (c, d and F') of this equation are
functions of the various flow rates identified in
Figure 4; their specific mathematical form is
derived in Appendix III with their final form
shown by equation (12) of that appendix. To
assess the adequacy of this model, estimates of c
and d generated by the model are compared with
the estimates from the observed Canadian time
series reported in Table 2. This comparison
requires empirical estimates of the model's flow

rates. The imprisonment rate of virgins, ri, is
exceedingly small. In Canada, for example, even
if we were to assume that all receptions into prison
in a year are of first-time offenders, ri would be
no larger than .0004 and (r2 + r3) no larger than
.72. For the period 1880 to 1960 the exponential
growth rate of the Canadian population was
about 0.019 and r4, the death rate, about .017.
Therefore, using equation (12) in Appendix III,
d is about 0.027, while c is about .79. In this model,
c must be more than twenty-five times larger

than d.
The values of c and d estimated from the
Canadian autoregression parameters (Table 2) are
.98 and .40, respectively. Thus, for Canada, Model
I yields only a fair estimate of c and dramatically
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r I = imprisonment rate of virgins
r2 = release rate from prison
r3 = imprisonment rate of ex-convicts
r4 = death rate

13

r5 = birth rate

FIGURE 4
Model I
underestimates d.14 The large underestimate of d
will result in the model predicting nonoscillatory
behavior in r(t).15 This is, however, completely
contrary to the strong cyclical behavior actually
observed. It then appears that Model I, which
considers only a steady-state balance of receptions
and releases does not adequately explain the
observed dynamics of the imprisonment rate. A
more elaborate flow structure is required.
B. Prisoner, Criminal,Law-Abider Model
We now propose an alternative partitioning of
the population into three subsets (Figure 5), now
identified as "law-abiders," "criminals" and
"prisoners," with the numbers in each group
varying over time. In the context of the behavior
distribution of Figure 2, the number of law-abiders
at time t, L(t), are those individuals whose behavior B(t) < Bo(t). Likewise, the criminal population, C(t), are those individuals with behavior
B(t) > Bo(t). The prison population, P(t), are
those individuals drawn from the criminal population who are confined in institutions at t.
13 For simplicity, differences between the death
rate of ex-convicts and virgins, as well as the small
death rate within prison, have been ignored.
14 When the predicted values of c and d are transformed into autoregressive form (equation (5) in
Appendix II), the respective values of 01 and 02 are
1.54 and -. 55. The predicted value of 01, 1.54, is
outside a 95% confidence interval of the value of
1.25 estimated from the actual data.
1
5 A necessary condition for oscillatory behavior is
that (e0 - 4d) < 0.

FIGURE 5
Model II-Stable imprisonment as a
homeostatic process
The composition of populations changes continuously, as shown in the flow diagram of Figure
5. Some criminals are arrested, convicted and sent
to prison at rate k 2 (t). Prisoners are regularly
released from prison, with some returning to the
criminal group [0k,(t)] and others becoming lawabiders [(I - O)kl(t)]. There is also an important
two-way flow between the criminal and lawabiding populations (k3(t) and k 1 (t)). As fB(x),
the behavior distribution in Figure 2, shifts to the
right, for example, C(t) increases and L(t) decreases correspondingly. Similarly, a shift to the
left, that is, to a population that is more lawabiding, results in a net flow from C(t) to L(t).
These changes in the population composition
would be reflected in changes in the normal flow
rates, ki(t), among the population groups.
The possibility of flows between the criminal and
law-abiding population is an important element
of the model because these flows permit the incorporation of a central theme of the homeostatic
notion, namely the redefinition of criminal behavior. Suppose, for example, that at time to the
system were in equilibrium and P(to)/T(t) was
the average long-term imprisonment rate. Now,
suppose that at t, the behavior distribution fB(x)
were to shift to the right, that is, the population
were to become more criminal by current standards. This shift would be reflected in an increase
in k 3(t) to k 3(t,) > k 3(tO). The increase in k 3(t)
would result in a net increase in the flow from L(t)
to C(t). That increase would perturb the system
from equilibrium and, holding all other ki(t) constant, would increase P(t)/T(t) and C(t)/T(t).
An increase in P(t)/T(t), according to the
homeostatic model, would set in motion the decriminalization of certain behavior by shifting the
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demarcation between criminal and non-criminal
behavior, B0 . This shift would be reflected by
readjustments in k 3(t) and k 4(t) such that C(t)/
T(t) and L(t)/T(t) would return toward the
equilibrium values.
Even when fB(x) and B0 are stable, there is a
regular flow between C(t) and L(t). A previously
law-abiding college student begins dealing in
drugs or a businessman finds that profits are substantially improved by criminal collusion with
competitors. An occasional burglar gets married
or gets a better job, and decides to cease his
criminal activity. Thus, each population is continuously feeding the others.
One can formalize the description of these flows
and again derive a second-order differential
equation for the imprisonment rate. This is done
in Appendix V under the preliminary assumption
that the ki(t) are approximately constant over
time."I The parameters of this differential equation
(c, d, and F') are functions of the flow rates for
Figure 5. The adequacy of Model II is tested by
determining the consistency of the model-generated equation with the observed dynamic behavior
of an actual time series for imprisonment rates.
Toward this end, the model will be analyzed
using rates associated with Canadian penitentiaries. The data were plotted in Figure 1. Visual
inspection of the series indicates no obvious trend
from 1880-1959. However, there does appear to
be a marked change in the dynamic behavior after
1925. To reduce the time variation in the k's (and,
therefore, in c, d and F'), we restrict ourselves to
the post-1925 series for the analysis.
To test the sufficiency of the derived differential
equation (Appendix V), estimates of the ki's must
be made to generate the theoretical values for c,
d, and F'. This differential equation can be used
to derive a theoretical autoregressive relationship
by the approximation shown in Appendix II. An
"This assumption of constant ki (t) disregards a
central element of the stability of punishment theory,
namely the changes in k3(t) and k4(t) that accompany
the adjustment of the standards defining punishable
behavior in response to shifts in objective behavior.
The static nature of this representation results in
serious limitation in the development and empirical
analysis which follow. It does not, however, render it
vacuous. If the model, even under the restriction of
constant ki(t), can generate coefficients which are
plausibly close to the actual values, then a rationale
for exploring more complicated forms where the
ki(t) vary will be established.
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TABLE 3

THE

RELEASE
PRISON

RATE

(k(t)), AVERAGE DAILY

POPULATION

POPULATION

(P(t))

(T(t)) FOR
1925-19601T

Year

kj(t)

Pt)

1925
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960

.37
.43
.55
.50
.46
.45
.52
.73

2266
2868
3895
3736
3063
4380
5204
6141

AND

TOTAL

CANADA:

T(t)

18

5,100,000
6,700,000
7,350,000
7,850,000
8,500,000
9,400,000
10,400,000
11,500,000

empirical autoregression can then be run on the
actual data to determine -whether the parameters
estimated from the data are comparable to those
generated by the theoretical model.
The known values of the system characterized
by Figure 5 are k, (the release rate), T(t) and
P(t). Their values at five-year intervals from 1925
to 1960 are given in Table 3. The year 1940 was
chosen to generate estimates for the model parameters. That year is about mid-way through
the series, and its release rate k1 and imprisonment
rate/100,000 (P/T X 10-) are the same as the
means for the series.
The unknown values are: k2 (the imprisonment
rate of criminals); k 3 (the rate at which law-abiders
become criminals); k4 (the rate at which criminals
0) (rehabilitation
become law-abiders); (1 rate); and C (the size of the criminal population).
Estimates for k2, k 3 , k4 are made for equilibrium
estimates of C/T of 1.5%, 1.0%, and 0.5%.
Since individuals do not continuously behave in a
criminal manner, a reasonable convention must
be established to operationalize the idea of an
individual belonging to the criminal population.
A reasonable definition might categorize a person
as a criminal in year t if he has committed an act
for which he would have been imprisoned if
caught and convicted.1 9 Then k 2 , the rate of
17 Prisoner statistics were obtained from unpublished statistics provided by the Office of Statistics,
Secretariat of the Ministry of the Solicitor General,
Government of Canada.
1
9The total population includes only persons 16
years of age or older.
9
1 Note that this definition restricts the minimum
time spent in the criminal population to 1 year.
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imprisonment of the criminal population, is the
ratio of prison receptions, a known value, to the
estimate of the size of the criminal population.
The analysis is relatively insensitive to the value
of 0, the portion of released prisoners returning
directly to the criminal population. A plausible
estimate is 0.33. Given our definition of membership in the criminal population, 0 includes all
those released prisoners who commit at least one
crime within a year of their release. In a study of
parole success, Gottfredson 2n reported that during
a two year follow-up period, 38% of released
prisoners returned to prison. In another study
cited by Robison and Smith, 2' 51% of released
prisoners returned to prison during the three
years immediately following their release. Since
recidivism rates decline with each additional year
following release and not all releasees who return
to crime are apprehended, it is not unreasonable
to assume that 33% of released prisoners return
immediately to the criminal population.
The value of k 4 is calculated somewhat differently. If r is the average time spent in C, then
k 4 , the rate at which criminals leave C, is the
reciprocal of -. -r is assigned a value of 2 years for
C/T = 1.5%. For the other values of C/T, 1.0%
and 0.5%, T is taken to be successively larger. A
smaller C is assumed to be associated with a
larger r to reflect a more "hard core" criminal
population in C. Thus, for C/T = 1.0%, we let
7 = 3 years and for C/T = 0.5%, we let r = 4
years.
The remaining parameter to be estimated is
k3. This parameter may be specified as the value
which will maintain C(t) at a constant level given
the values of k,, k2 , and k 4 . This is equivalent to
assuming that the first derivative of C(t) is zero.2 2
The values of the k's and the resulting differential equation and autoregression coefficients are
given in Table 4 for the three assumed values of
C/T. For comparison, the empirical second-order
autoregression function estimated from the annual
10 D.

GOTTFREDSON, THE ROLE OF BASE EXPEC-

TATIONS IN THE

STUny

OF TREATMENTS

(1959).

"' Robison & Smith, The Effectiveness of Correctional
Programs, 17 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 67 (1971).
2 From the second equation in system (22) of
Appendix V we have:

-Oki P(t) + (Nd + kQ)C(t)
T(t) - P(t) - C(t)

Canadian imprisonment rate from 1925-1960 is as
follows:
rt = 1.23rt- -

(8.26)

.4 3r,..i + 9.17

(-2.89)

(1)

(2.25)

where the values in parentheses are the t-values
associated with each of the coefficients. A comparison of the parameter estimates of equation (1)
with the corresponding autoregression parameters
theoretically derived from the ki in Table 4 show
them to be roughly equivalent.23 The coefficient
of rt-1, 01, is overestimated by about 5% to 15%,
whereas

q52

is underestimated by about the same

amount in each case. The relative direction of
these differences is consistent with the high negative correlation (-.82) between the coefficients
of rt -- and rt-2 in the autoregression.
The value of the constant term.'is underestimated by as much as 60% in the theoretical estimates, 8' X 105. However, all of the estimates of
a' x 105 are within a 90% confidence interval of
the regression value (2.57, 15.77).
Overall, despite the speculative, albeit plausible,
nature of some of the parameter estimates, the
model appears to do remarkably well in generating
parameters consistent with those estimated from
the actual data. The encouraging nature of these
results indicates the potential merit of this approach to modeling the imprisonment process and
justifies further work in this direction, especially
efforts to examine the process without the restrictive assumption of constant flow rates. Furthermore, while acknowledging the tentative nature
of Model II, one can cautiously begin to interpret
the flow rates in the model in an effort to characterize those features of a society which contribute
to its particular imprisonment rate.
V.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL-A
PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS

As a corollary to the hypothesis of the stability
of crime, Durkheim also conjectured that the
particular level of crime would vary among different "social types" and that it might be possible to
The empirically estimated parameters in equation (1) are based on the imprisonment rate per
100,000 population, while the parameters in Table 4
are based on this rate per unit of population. Although
the rates differ by a factor of 10-, the coefficients
0i are unaffected and may be directly compared.
However, the constant term 6 in Table 4 must be
multiplied by 101 when .it is compared to the constant in equation (1).
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TABLE 4
ESTIMATES OF FLOW PARAMETERS
AUTOREGRESSION

AND

(ki)

FOR MODEL II

DIFFERENTIAL
CANADIAN

IMPRISONMENT

AND

THE ASSOCIATED COEFFICIENTS FOR THE

GENERATED

EPUATIONS

RATES FROM

BY MODEL

II

USING ANNUAL

1925-1960

Y(t) + ci(t) + dr(t) = F'

(i)
(ii)

rt = 4oirt-i + 402rt-2 + 8'
C/T

7r4

C/T

C/T =1.0%

0.5%

7

7r

3

1.5%
2

Flow Parameters:

(

ki =
k2 =
k3 =
k4 =
(1 )=

.50
k=
k 2 = .046
k3= .0014
4
.25
- 0) =.67

k1=
k2 =
k3 =
k4 =
(1 -0) =

.50
.023
.0035
.33
.67

.50
.015
.0078
.50
.67

Differential Equation Coefficients.Y
c = .84
d = .16
F = 6.4 X 10 5

Autoregression Coefficients.
41 = 1.42
0,2 = -.50
5' = 3.2 X 10

5

c = 1.06
d = .28
-5
F' = 11.7 X 10

c = .89
d = .19
-5
F' = 8.1 X 10
8

41 = 1.39

0, = 1.31

952 ----. 48

02 = -- 43

8' = 3.9 X 10 5

-5
8' = 5.0 X 10

C/T = average criminal population/total population.
r = mean stay in criminal population.
specify the level appropriate to each "social
26
Two of the authors have argued elsetype."
where;' that Durkheim was not speaking of the
28
level of actual criminal behavior that occurs,
but rather the level of punished criminal acts.
Hence, it is the level of punishment meted out
which remains stable, but varies in magnitude
among different classes of societies.
A brief inspection of Figure I provides visual
evidence for this corollary. While there is a stable
process in each country with the annual imprisonment rate fluctuating around the mean, there are
substantial differences among those means. The
mean imprisonment rate for the United States is
2 These coefficients are estimated for (i)above
using (20).
25 These coefficients are estimated for (ii) above
using (6) and the results for differential equation (i).
26 E. DURKHEim, supra note 1, at 66-67. A "social
type" is simply a collection of similar societies. More
formally, "social types" may be thought of as equivalence classes within the set of societies.
27 Blumstein & Cohen, supra note 2, at 199.
28 This would include any act that is a violation
of some criminal statute.

2-3 times greater than the rate in either Norway
29
In an effort to account for these
or Canada.
differences, Model II will be interpreted in terms
of some general societal characteristics. The ways
in which these characteristics generate different
imprisonment rates can then be examined within
the framework identified by the model.
Two characteristics of societies important to the
phenomena of crime and punishment are the
2) The definition of and institutional arrangements
for prison populations vary considerably from
country to country. The Canadian and U. S. data
include only individuals in prisons and penitentiaries which are largely restricted to persons serving
sentences of one year or more. In Norway, on the
other hand, the typical sentence for the prison population rarely exceeds two months. Nevertheless,
despite these differences, the selected prison statistics
refer to the most severe penalty imposed in each
country, aside from capital punishment. Our intention is to gain insight into the reasons for differences
in the level of only the most severe form of punishment. From this perspective, then, the differences in
definition allow cautious comparison of the rates
while always keeping in mind the potential incompatibilities.
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level of conformity within a society and the degree
of punitiveness. The parameters ki and k2 in
Figure 5 reflect two aspects of the degree of punitiveness that are often cited, the severity and
certainty of punishment. When other forms of
punishment are ignored and only imprisonment
is considered, the severity of punishment varies
with the time actually served in prison. Since increases in the time served result in decreases in
the release rate from prison, ki, the release rate,
may be regarded as an inverse measure of the
severity of punishment. The lower the value of
ki, the more severe the punishment meted out.
Alternatively, the flow rate of criminals to prison,
k 2 , reflects the certainty of punishment for criminal behavior. The higher the value of k 2 , the
more criminals are imprisoned.
Parameters k3 and k 4 in Figure 5 are the flows
between the law-abiding and criminal populations and together they reflect the overall level of
conformity in a society. The magnitude of the
flow from law-abiders to criminals, k3 , provides
some indication of the strength of the commitment to conformity within a society; the stronger
the commitment, the smaller the outflow of lawabiders. The level of commitment to conformity
in any society is probably a complex product of a
number of different contributing factors, among
them the successful internalization of the normative code, the deterrent effects associated with
penalties and the heterogeneity of the society.
These factors affect the commitment to conformity differently and operate on very different
dimensions of an individual's motivation. The
more deeply rooted the norms and values of a
society in the individual consciences of its members, the stronger will be their commitment to
conformity. In this case the members conform out
of a sense of duty or obligation. Deterrence, on the
other hand, captures the extent to which individuals respond to the costs associated with the
penalty structure. Effective deterrence will increase the strength of commitment to conformity.
Alternatively, greater heterogeneity in a society,
be it cultural, ethnic, racial or religious, can
weaken the overall commitment to conformity
through the existence of competing normative
systems which may be at odds with the official
institutionalized standards. As the members of a
society respond to the behavioral codes of different sub-cultures, there will be a larger variance
in actual behavior and more chances of deviance.

While Model II does not permit distinguishing
the contributions of these different factors, the
effect of the resulting commitment to conformity
can be examined through parameter k 3 .
Parameter k4 is the flow from the criminal
population to the law-abiding population. It
reflects the endurance of the criminal role, or the
extent to which individuals remain active criminals after committing a single crime. Thus, k4 may
be thought of as an inverse measure of the prevalence of hardcore criminality in a society. As k4
gets smaller, fewer criminals return to the lawabiding population and the more enduring the
criminal role.
The endurance of the criminal roleis undoubtedly the result of a complicated process involving
both the availability of opportunities to return to
the law-abiding population and the existence of
disincentives to remain a criminal. The opportunities to return are a function of the permanence of
the stigma attached to being labeled a criminal
and of institutionalized barriers which explicitly
exclude former criminals from various aspects of a
law-abiding life, for example, laws which bar
known criminals from certain types of employment. The disincentives to remaining a criminal
vary with the effectiveness of deterrents. The only
deterrent explicitly identified in Model II is imprisonment. Nevertheless, a host of other unspecified deterrents, such as arrest and conviction, may
also operate on the criminal population and be
reflected in variations in the value of k4 . In
general, increases in both legitimate opportunities
and criminal disincentives will be associated with
decreases in the endurance of the criminal role
and increases in k 4 .

Having identified each parameter in terms of
punitiveness and conformity, the differential
impact of these characteristics on the imprisonment rate and the level of criminality in a society
can be explored. The flow process in Figure 5 can
easily be translated into a Markov process in
which the populations are the states of the process
and the flow rates become the transition probabilities of moving from one state to another.
Assuming the ki(t) are constant over time, the
transition matrix for Model II is:

P(t + l) C(t + l)
P(t) [1 - k1
M=C(t)
k2
L(t)

L

0

OkL
I -k 2 -k
k3

L(t + 1)

(I -O)k1 1
4

k4
I -k 3
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TABLE 5
THE EQUILIBRIUM DISTRIBUTION AMONG PRISONERS (P), CRIMINALS (C)
WITH DIFFERENT VALUES OF THE

Parameter Values

k2

k3

.025

.005

C(P)
Prisoners

.333

175.8
140.6
105.5
70.4
35.2

1406.1
1406.5
1407.0
1407.5
1408.1

98416.3
98452.4
98486.8
98521.8
98556.6

.333

.333

29.0
70.4
134.3
192.8
246.3

1449.0
1407.5
1343.6
1285.2
1231.6

98521.7
98521.8
98521.8
98522.0
98521.8

.333

14.2
42.5
70.4
111.7
138.7

284.9
849.5
1407.5
2232.4
2774.2

99700.7
99107.9
98521.8
97657.5
97087.1

.333

112.6
91.9
70.4
47.9
24.5

2253.1
1838.8
1407.5
958.0
489.3

97633.7
98068.9
98521.8
98993.9
99486.2

1384.9
1399.4
1407.5
1424.3
1450.1

98545.7
98530.4
98521.8
98504.2
98477.1

1.000J
II..
.010O
.025

.050

.10075,
(.lOOJ

0.05

II

6

.5001

.500

OF MODEL

Rates/100,000 Total Population
k

.20
.250
.333

AND LAW-ABIDERS (L), ASSOCIATED

PARAMETERS

.333

(C)

Criminals

(L)

Law-Abiders

III.
.011

l-OO31
.500

.025

.005

.333

.0081
.o010
.20d
.2501
.005

.333

•.500

I

1.000,

.333

Since this matrix is regular,0 the equilibrium
probability distribution among the three states
can be obtained by raising the matrix to successive
powers, Mn . As n becomes large, each row of M
will approach the same equilibrium vector and
any row of the matrix gives the equilibrium distribution.
This feature of matrix M permits the use of
simulation techniques to examine the equilibrium
distribution for different assigned values of the ki
and 0 in M. By systematically changing the value
of one parameter at a time, one can investigate
the effect of that parameter alone on the equi10 A transition matrix is regular if there is at least
one path, perhaps multi-step, from each state to
every other state.

.100
.250
.333
.500
.750

librium distribution. Each parameter is assigned
five values, while holding all other parameters

constant. The entries in Table 5 are the equilibrium rates/100,000 total population for each of
the three sub-populations of interest.31
Section I of Table 5 indicates the effects of
varying the severity of punishment, I/k 1 . As ki
increases, punishments become less severe and the
average imprisonment rate decreases sharply. In
fact, as the average time served drops from 5 years
to 1 year, the imprisonment rate also decreases
five-fold. However, the proportion of criminals
among the total population is virtually unaffected
by changes in ki. This is largely due to P's com31The rates in Table 5 were found by multiplying

the equilibrium probability of each state by 10-.
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paratively small size with respect to both C and
L. Ii fact, for all values of kl in the table, P is
never even 0.2% of the total population and it
represents at most only 12.5% of the criminal
population. 32 Thus, changes in ki, which affect
the flow out of P, will have very little effect on
the size of C. Any variations in the deterrent
effect associated with changes in the release rate,
ki, will be manifested in changes in k3 and k4 ,
the flows between criminals and law-abiders.
Since these flows are held constant as k, varies,
this effect cannot be detected in this analysis.
The variations in k 2 (section II, Table 5) reflect
changes in the certainty of punishment. As k 2 increases, a higher proportion of criminals are
imprisoned and the imprisonment rate increases.
There is also some change in the relative size of
the criminal population which decreases by 15%
from 1449 to 1232 criminas/100,000 population
as k2 increases from .01 to .10. To the extent that
the level of crime is a function of the number of
criminals, the response of the criminal population
to changes in k1 and k2 is consistent with the currently popular notion that it is the certainty of
punishment and not its severity which has the
greatest deterrent effect on crime.n
Parameter k3 is assumed to vary with the
strength of the commitment to conformity in a
society. The larger k3 , the weaker that commitment and the more frequently law-abiders commit
crimes. As section III of Table 5 reveals, increases
in k3 are accompanied by similar increases in
both the relative size of the criminal population
and the imprisonment rate.
The magnitude of parameter k 4 reflects the
2 These are not unreasonable bounds on the relative size of P. In the United States in 1970, for example, there were slightly less than 200,000 state and
federal prisoners, or about 0.1% of the total population. BUREAU
BULL. No. 47,

OF PRISONS, U. S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS: PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS FOR

ADULT FELONS: 1968, 1969, 1970 (April 1972).
During the same year there were 1,272,783 reported arrests for Index Crimes. FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, U. S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTs: 1970 (1970). Since the arrests of all

police agencies are not contained in the reported figures and not all criminals are arrested, 2,500,000 is
not an unreasonable estimate of the size of the criminal population. In this case the prisoner population
is only 8 per cent of the criminal population.
3 Wilson, Lock 'em Up and Other Thoughts on Crime,
N. Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1975, §6 (Magazine), at 11,
col. 1; The Purpose of Prison, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 10,
1975, at 36, col. 3 (quoting James Q. Wilson).

prevalence of "occasional" criminals as opposed
to hard-core "careerists" in the criminal population. As k4 increases, more criminals return to the
law-abiding population, indicating criminality of
a more transitory nature. It is thus no surprise
that as k 4 increases (section IV, Table 5), both
the relative size of the criminal population and
the imprisonment rate decrease. In fact, a five-fold
increase in k4 from 0.2 to 1.0 is accompanied by a
five-fold decrease in the rates of criminals and
prisoners in the population.
The last section of Table 5 presents the effects
of changes in 0, the recidivism rate of released
prisoners. It is clear that the populations are virtually insensitive to changes in recidivism. Sizable
increases in 0 have very little effect on the size of
the criminal and prison populations. As with
parameter ki, the lack of effect on the criminal
population is due to the extremely small size of P,
which in section V of the table is less than 0.1%
of the total population and represents only 5% of
the criminal population. The variations in the
number flowing from this small P to C that result
from changes in 0 will hardly be noticed in C.
Furthermore, since 0 determines the distribution of
the flow out of P and not the magnitude of that
flow, changes in 0 have virtually no effect on the
size of P.
With the exception of 0, changes in any one
parameter of the model result in important differences in the imprisonment rate. The most striking
consequence of the model, however, is the predominant effect of k3 or k 4 alone on the criminal
population. This has important policy implications for the control of crime. If Model II is an
accurate representation of the flow process among
law-abiders, criminals and prisoners, the results
in Table 5 suggest that the activities of the criminal justice system, reflected in isolated changes in
parameters ki, k 2 or 0, alone have very little
impact on the size of the criminal population.
According to Model II, manipulations of only
the time served in prison (1/ki) or the various
efforts in prisons to reduce recidivism (0) will not
affect the incidence of criminals. Furthermore,
singly increasing the rate at which criminals go to
prison (k 2) has only a marginal effect on the
criminal population, while greatly expanding the
prison population. According to Model II, although the imprisonment policies of a society are
important in determining the imprisonment rate,
taken one by one they are for the most part in-
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consequential to the extent of criminality in a
society.
The size of the criminal population is most
responsive to the parameters reflecting the level
of conformity, namely k 3 and k 4 . To the extent
that conformity is a function of an effective
socialization process and/or the homogeneity of a
society, very little in the form of implementable
policies can be done to reduce the proportion of
criminals. However, to the extent that deterrence
and opportunities for return to the law-abiders are
operating, more reasonable attempts can be made
to reduce criminality. Certainly, any efforts to
remove barriers to a return to the law-abiding
population which increase the value of k 4 will

decrease the level of criminality. The more interesting policy implication, however, is the important role of deterrence in reducing crime. Inasmuch as effective general deterrence increases
incentives to remain a law-abider (decreases k 3),
while effective special deterrence increases incentives to leave the criminal population (increases
k4), the level of conformity increases and the proportion of criminals decreases. The exact mechanisms involved in optimizing these deterrence
effects are then vital to efforts to reduce crime.
The results in Table 5 identify only the effects
of "pure" changes in the parameters and as such
they are necessarily artificial. Undoubtedly, several of the parameters will vary at the same time,
and the actual population distributions will
reflect the cumulative effect of these different
parameters, as well as any interactive effects due
to functional relationships among the parameters.
Nevertheless, looking at the effects of each parameter alone does provide some opportunity for
exploring the indirect implications of the model.
VI. SUMMARY

It has been conjectured that a homeostatic
process operates within a society to maintain a
stable level of punishment. This process is presumed to work through adaptive responses to
changes in criminal behavior. In the short run
these responses might involve changes in sentencing policies, such as an increase in the number
of persons sentenced to prison or a decrease in the
length of sentences imposed. In the long run, the
limits of criminal behavior may actually be redefined through changes in law and/or in practice. The result is either the decriminalization of
previously criminal acts or the addition of newly
prohibited acts to the criminal code.
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Evidence of the stability of punishment, in particular, has been presented. The national imprisonment rates in three countries were shown
to be trendless time series, each generated by a
second-order autoregressive process. Two models
specifying the flow of individuals among different
population groups were specified in an effort to
identify the underlying dynamic process responsible for this stability.
Model I, which requires only a simple balancing
of prison receptions and releases, was shown to be
inadequate. For reasonable estimates of the parameter values of this process, it does not yield the
observed cyclical behavior in imprisonment rates.
A second model, which includes movements
between the law-abiding and criminal populations,
results in a better fit between the predicted and
actual time series. Furthermore, Model II can be
interpreted in terms of the levels of punitiveness
and conformity in a society, thereby integrating
the model into the existing body of work on deviance and social control.
The model, however, requires further development if its adequacy is to be fully explored. The
major limitation in the development presented
here is the assumption of constant flow rates
among the populations. A central feature of the
stability of punishment theory is adaptive behavior. In the context of our model, incorporation
of adaptive behavior would require time-varying
k's. The incorporation of time-varying ki's into
the model in a manner that is consistent with the
theory would represent a major extension to our
work. Also, the model does not explicitly incorporate deterrent effects. A further elaboration of
the relationship of the flow rates to the deterrence
process would further enhance the generality of
the model by providing some synthesis of the
stability of punishment with the notion of deterrence.
APPENDIX I

TIME SERIES ANALYSIS

The autoregressive structure is defined by
T

Yt = 6 +

-

i-1

iYt-1Et

(1)

where
Yt is the observation in period t,
6, qbi are the fixed parameters of the generating process,
et's are independent and identically dis-
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tributed random variables with zerb
mean and variance cr2.
Equation (1) states that the observation at t (Yt)
is a weighted linear function of a constant and the
observations of T prior periods, plus an independent stochastic error, et. The time series analysis
provides a means for estimating the number of
prior periods, if any, for which the O's are significantly different from zero. The "order" of the
autoregressive process is equal to largest subscript
of the non-zero O's. For example, if qa > 0 and
qi = 0 for all i > 3, the process is called a "thirdorder" autoregression.
The autoregressive structure assumes the stochastic component, et, to be independent of the
stochastic components of prior observations. In
time-series data, this is often not the case and the
et's may be serially correlated over one or many
periods.
A moving-average process is defined by:
Yt = u + E

(2)

where, now:
T

Et = 4t + E]yipt,-

(3)

The general second-order differential equation
with constant coefficients is Ft + c t + drt = F,
and, in the approximating difference equation,
we have:
Ft +

ci' + drt = (rt -

zero variance U2.

rt= I

DIFFERENTIAL

EQUATION

OF A SECOND-ORDER

Ft = (rt -

REPRESENTATION

AUTORFGREssIVE PROCEsS

rt-1
rt-)

-

(4)

2-c

I rt-1

+

where
where 01,
d and F.

02,

_C+7+
d rt-2 + 1+ c+

di

and 8 are expressed in terms of c,
APPENDIX* III

DERIVATION OF SECOND-ORDER DIFFERENTIAL

EQUATION ASSOCIATED WITH MODEL I

The relationship among the flows of Model I
may be formalized as follows:
=

-rsP(t)

+ raM(t) + riV(t)

f(t) = rzP(t) V(t) =

-(ri

(r. + r 4)M(t)

(6)

+ r 4)V(t) + rsT(t)

where
P(t), lM(t), V(t) = rate of change at t of the
respetive populations
ri = imprisonment rate of virgins
r2 = release rate from prison
r3 = imprisonment rate of exconvicts
r4 = death rate 4
rs = birth rate

Processes following a second-order linear differential equation, not necessarily with constant
coefficients, generate second-order autoregressive
functions. By approximating the derivatives in the
differential equation by difference equations, that
is, if rt is the imprisonment rate at time t, and its
first two time derivatives are denoted by i't and
:t, then we approximate it and it by:
ft = rt -

rt-2)

+c+ d(5)

APPENDIX II

THE

(rt-i -

Equation (4) then leads to the second-order autoregressive function:

'(t)

The analyses provide a means for estimating u
and the yi which are diffevent from zero. As with
autoregressive processes, the "order" of the moving
average is defined by the maximum subscript of
the y i's which are different from zero.

-

+ c(rt - rt-O + drt = F.

where:
u, -y

are fixed parameters of the generating
process,
P/t are independent and identically distributed random variables with mean

rt,.)

(rt-1 -

rt-2)

Since the sum of P(t), M(t) and V(t) is the
total population at time t, T(t), then V(t) may
be replaced in the first equation of (6) by:
V(t) = T(t) -

P(t) -

M(t)

The dynamic behavior of P(t) can now be expressed by a system of two flow equations where:
P(t) = - (r 2 + ri)P(t) + (r3 - rs)M(t) + riT(t)

l9f(t) = r2P(t) - (rS + r 4)M(t)
34

(7)

For the purpose, of simplicity the differences
between the death rate of ex-cons and of virgins and
the small number of deaths of prisoners have been
ignored.
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Rearranging terms,

or, in matrix form

F(t) + ct(t) + dr(t) = F'35

-k = AY + F
where
_Fp(t)

F-(rl +

1

L

LM(t)]

F

=

(r3

r2)

r2

-r

-

3 ±

ri)1

r 4 )J

where
c = a + 2g =
d = b + ag +
+ ag +
F' = r 3r1 + r4r,

(12)

r1 + r 2 + r3 + r4 + 2 g
g2 = rs(r 2 + r3) + r 4(ri + r2)
g2
+ rig

[rlT(t)]
APPENDIX IV

Using the procedure outlined in Appendix IV,
P(t) may be translated to:
P(t) + aP(t) + bP(t) = Fp

(8)

Suppose we have a system of simultaneous flows
among three populations, A(t), B(t), C(t), where:

A(t) = aiiA(t) + ai2B(t) + ai3C(t)
t(t)

where
a = (r, + r2 + 13 + r 4)
b = (r3 + r 4)(r, + r 2) - r2(r3 - ri)
= rs(r 2 + r 3) + ra(rI + r 2)
Fp = - (ri + r2)rT(t) + (ri + r 2 + r3 + r4)

riT(t) + riT(t) = (r3 + r 4)riT(t)
+ riT(t)
Equation (8) is a differential equation describing
the dynamic behavior of the total prison population, P(t), whereas the autoregressions and their
implied differential equations are expressed in
terms of a rate of imprisonment per population.
However, a translation between the two can be
made; when r(t) is the imprisonment rate per unit
of population:
P(t) = r(t)T(t)

0(t) = a 31A(t) + a32B(t) + anC(t)

such that
A(t) + B(t) + C(t) = T(t)

(9b)

P(t) = iF(t)T(t) + 2 (t)T(t) + r(t)T(t)

(9c)

As a first estimate of T(t), we assume that after
accounting for "deaths," T(t) grows exponentially,
T(t) = To0 eg

T(t) = total population at t
aij may possibly be zero.

(10a)

P(t) = Toegt (r(t) + gr(t))

(10b)

P(t) = Toert(F(t) + 2gf(t) + g 2r(t))

(10c)

We then substitute equations (10) into (8) and
divide the equation by T(t). Then:
2
[F(t) + 2gf(t) + g r(t)]

+ a[i(t) + gr(t)] + br(t) =

eo7

(11)

A(t) - B(t), system (13)

Since C(t) = T(t) -

may be re-written as:
k(t) = (a,, -

a, 3)A(t) + (a12 -

a,3)B(t)

+ ai 3T(t)
an)A(t) + (a22 -

an)B(t)

(15)

+ anT(t)
or in matrix notation:
(16)

V= AY +F
where:

Then:

P(t) = Toestr(t)

(14)

with:

h(t) = (a21 -

P(t) = i(t)T(t) + r(t)t(t)

(13) (b)

= a 2 1A(t) + a 22B(t) + anC(t)

(9a)

then:

(a)

A

=

FA(t) 1

-F(t)l

LB(t) j

B(t)]

F(al

- a 13)
a 23)

L_(a
21 -

(a 12

-

[a,,T(t)'1
F

a23T(t)J

a 13)]

(a22
a23)]
35It should be noted that equation (12) is based
on the imprisonment rate per unit of population,
while the estimated differential equations in Table 2
are based on the rate per 100,000 population. Although the rates differ by a factor of 105, the coefficients c and d are unaffected and may be directly
compared. The constant term F', however, must be
multiplied by 105 when it is compared to the constant term F in Table 2.

1976]

HOMEOSTATIC PUNISHMENT

Taking the derivative of (16), we get:

where

-k = AYz + V

(17)

P(t), d(t), l(t)

respective populations (i.e.,
their first derivatives)
kl(t) = release rate from prison at t
k2 (t) = imprisonment rate of the

Substituting (16) for l'
i

= A2Y + AF + P

(18)

Let a and b be the coefficients of the quadratic
equation resulting from taking the determinant
of[A - XI]:
(an

a13)

-

(a2

-

(a2 l - a 23)

(a 22

a2)

-

a 23) - X19

-

C11-X

(19)

C12

C21

c 2 2-

or

X)(c22 -

(c11 -

X) - c21clZ = 0

(20)

c2iclZ) = 036

(cII + c2)X + (cucI2 -

X-

= rate of change at t of the

criminal population at t
k 3(t) = rate at which law-abiders
become criminals at t
k 4(t) = rate at which criminals become law-abiders at t
ks(t) = net population growth rate
at t
0 = portion of the persons released from prison who return to criminal activity
Since the sum of P(t), C(t) and L(t) is the total
population at t, T(t), we can replace L(t) by
L(t) = T(t) -

Thus,
a = -(cll
b

+ c 22)

= c11c22 -

and the dynamic behavior of P(t) can be expressed
by the two flow equations:

c21c12

Adding the sum (a' + bY) to both sides of (18)

P(t) = -k(t)P(t) + k 2(t)C(t)
6(t) = [0k 1 (t) -

+ al+bY = (A2Y + ak + bY) + AF +
= (A2Y + aAY + bY) + aF

+ AF+

P(t)

C(t) -

k3(t)]P(t) -

(23)
[k 2(t) + k3(t)

+ k4(t)]C(t) + k3(t)T(t)
In matrix form:

P

k = AY + F
where:
= [(t)]

= [A2 + aA + bI)Y + aF

Y = [(t)]

F

=

(t)]1

+ AF + F
= aF + AF +

(21)

2

since A + aA + bI =.0 and (21) are no longer
simultaneous.
APPENDIX V
DERIVATION OF THE SE!COND-ORDER DIFFERENTIAL
EQUATION

AssOCIATED WITH MODEL II

The relationship among the flows of Model II
can be formalized as follows:
P(t) = -k(t)P(t)

-

k4 (t)C(t)

+ k3 (t)L(t)

L(t) = (I

-

(22)

O)k1 (t)P(t) + k 4(t)C(t)

k3(t)L(t) + k 5(t)T(t)
36
The values of X which satisfy equation (20) are
the eigenvalues of A.
-

k(t) +
+ k3(t) + k4(t)).J

The equations in (23) are a first-order system
of simultaneous differential equations like those
examined in the discussion of Model I, but here
the coefficients are not necessarily constant. In the
case of constant coefficients each population was
defined solely in terms of its own derivatives, for
instance:
P(t) + aP'(t) + bP(t) = F,

+ k 2 (t)C(t)

d(t) = 0ki(t)P(t) - k 2(t)C(t)

,-kli(t)- k&()) -(k2(t)
A = =L(Ok,(t)

and a, b and F, were determined from the matrix
A (Appendix IV). A similar solution in terms of
its own derivatives also exists for each population
when the coefficients are not constant, namely:
' + a(t)-

+ b(t)Y = F(t)

(24)

However, now the time-varying coefficients, a(t),
b(t) and F(t), are in general complicated and, in
this case, elusive functions of the ki(t). Neverthe-
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less, as a point of departure we car. explore the
dynamic character of this model by assuming the
ki(t) are approximately constant.
Under the assumption of constant ki, the differential equation governing the behavior of P(t),
the prison population, is:

We can change (25) into a differential equation
describing the behavior of the rate of imprisonment per unit of population, r(t) using the procedure outlined in (8) through (12) in Appendix III
to yield:
i

i(t) + alS(t) + bP(t) = Fp
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c + dr = F'

(25)
where

where:
a = kl + k2 + k3 + k 4

c = a + 2g

b = k[(l - O)k2 + k 3 + k4] + k 2k3

d = b + ag +

F, = k 2k 3T(t)

F' = k 2k3 .

g

2

(26)

